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FAITH AND REASON
Warning the Reader
in
The Pilgrim's Progress
Kenneth Chong

t the beginning of The Pilgrim's Progress, the narrator tells
us that he "saw a Man cloathed with Raggs, standing in a
certain place, with his face from his own House, a Book
in his hand, and a great burden upon his Back.'" That burden first came,
as Christian tells Worldly-Wiseman, "by reading this Book in my hand,"
where the Book is glossed in the margin as "the Bible" (18). After turning
out of the way. Christian finds deliverance from his bur
den—representing, of course, sin and guilt—at a place that contains a
cross and a sepulchre: "So I saw in my Dream, that just as Christian came
up with the Cross, his burden loosed from offhis Shoulders, and fell from

'John Bunyan, The Pilgrim'sProgress, ed.James Blanton Wharey, rev. Roger Sharrock, 2nd edn.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 8. All further references are to this edition and are included
in parentheses in the text.

38

1650-1850

off his back; and began to tumble; and so continued to do, till it came to
the mouth of the Sepulcher, where it fell in, and I saw it no more" (38).
Unlike Christian's previous attempt to rid himself of his burden—that is,
when he follows Worldly-Wiseman's advice to seek out Mr. Legality, only
to be almost overwhelmed by a Hill along that route, named Mount Sinai,
that both increased the weight of his burden and threatened to fall on
him—the description of Christian's release from his burden is somewhat
understated, even passive. It is surprising to Christian, and to us, that the
mere "sight of the Cross" eases (or, more precisely, evacuates) the burden
(38); and yet it conveys so accurately that Christ has taken on all our sin
and guilt and that all we can do is nothing except believe.
Although the burden has been released for Christian, the burden of
interpretation still remains on the reader. This is Dayton Raskin's
argument, and it begins with the hypothesis that the "two burdens, though
they are distinct and of different natures,are related; that both the burden
of Christian's back and that which the book imposes upon the reader can
be understood with reference to developments within the Perkins
tradition."^ The first burden is the burden of sin, and it is by interpreta
tion ("reading this Book") that Christian is awakened to his corruption;
this "image of guilt" can be traced to the Bible and the Reformers, who
forged the "intimate connection between guilt and interpretation" (260).
The second burden is the burden of assurance, and it developed from the
rise of Protestant scholasticism and the emergence of the experimental
predestinarian tradition. By assimilating the scholastic principle that
"everything necessary for salvation is contained in the Bible," which put
"an immense burden of interpretation" on the lone individual, the
experimental predestinarians, starting with William Perkins, were able to
formulate this key question asked of believers: "granted that God has
elected only a certain number, am I among the elect or the reprobate?"
(265). As a result, Raskin notes that

^Dayton Haskin, "The Burden of Interpretation in The Pilgrim's Progress' Studies in Philology,
79 (1982): 258. Unless otherwise noted, further references are included in parentheses in the
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The interpretive burden had been defined in a new way; and it
had now less to do with sin and guilt than with the need that
believers felt for assurance. All this depended...on aparticularly .
telling feature of the Calvinists' revision of Calvin: they drove
a wedge between faith, which they still believed to be a free gift
of God, and assurance, which was thought to be a necessary
component of saving faith, to be achieved by human effort.
(267-68)
Haskin contends that Bunyan, too, through his reading of works of
popular piety influenced by Perkins, separates faith and assurance, and
therefore places the burden of assurance on the reader of his book, a
burden that can only be eased when assurance has been suflficiendy
attained, that is, when one has verified the authenticity of one's elect status
through diligent scripture-searching and acute introspection.
But the question with which the experimental predestinarians in this
tradition interrogated themselves—am I saved or damned?—fostered
feelings not of assurance but of doubt. The reason is that underlying the
key question is the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, which states that
before the creation of the world God had already ordained (that is,
predestined) some to election and the rest to reprobation. Since the
operation of election occurs without the involvement of the humans it
predestines, the actions that humans perform cannot logically have any
bearing on their election. "Far from giving any sense of security," Stuart
Sim explains, "the effect of this doctrine was more generally to make its
adherents analyse their own conduct and works with scrupulous care."'
That is, the elect (if they are indeed the elect) can only search for signs of
their election—they obviously cannot cause it through their works; but no
one sign (or combination of signs) will prove decisive in verifying their
soterial status (to use the theological term for whether one is the elect or
not). Moreover, as Sim points out, Calvin argues that although the elect

'"'Safe forThose for WhomIt Is toBe Safe': Salvation and Damnation in Bimyan's Fiction," in
Anne Laurence, W. R. Owens, and Stuart Sim, eds., John Bunyan and His England, 1628-88
(London: Hambledon Press, 1990), 150.
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cannot claim any credit for God's extension of grace, the reprobate are
morally culpable for the withholding of that grace. It is here, then, that we
encounter a paradox: the reprobate are simultaneouslypredetermined and
freely responsible for their damnation. Sim explains the consequences of
predestinarian soteriology and its paradoxical nature:
Paradox generally creates a state of anxiety in the mind of the
elect, and indeed anxiety is possibly the most important element
Calvinism passes on to its followers. The anxiety that comes
from contemplation of soteriological paradox, and the recogni
tion that signs of grace are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for election, proves to be almost a sign of election in
itself....It does seem to be the case that the elect continually
manifest feelings of anxiety, and that the reprobate commonly
do not.'^
In other words, rationalizing about whether one is saved or not—search
ing for "signs ofgrace"—wdthin the paradoxes of predestination makes the
burden of assurance really a burden of anxiety. Such a burden is apparently
felt by the pilgrims (and the reader) in Bunyan's prose epic, and it is a
burden so overwhelming that Sim declares, "anxiety is arguably Bunyan's
most important legacy to literary history."' This, however, is not the case.
I contend that the anxiety of soterial status and interpretations based on
that anxiety are exactly what Bunyan, like Calvin, warn against; for as
products of carnal reason they are opposed to the promises of God (found
in the Word) that the author encourages us to believe. It is the various
forms of this carnal reason—speculation, notional knowledge, rationality,
false belief—that Bunyan presents as temptations to the reader so that he
may recognize them (in the text and in himself) and forsake them, as the
true pilgrims do, for the way of faith.^

^ Sim, ""Safe for Those for Whom It Is to Be Safe,'" 151-52.
'Stuart Sim, Negotiations With Paradox: Narrative Practice and NarrativeForm in Bunyan and
Defoe (Savage; Barnes and Noble, 1990), 45.
'In thisessay1will often refer to "the reader"as "he." The male pronoun here is not intended to
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We may begin with Calvin. It might be surprising to find that the
Calvinist heritage—which Sim and other commentators claim to be
introspection, doubt, and anxiety—is repudiated by Calvin himself.
Before he tackles the doctrine of predestination in Book III of his
Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin informs us that "human
curiosity" will render such a discussion "very confusing and even
dangerous," for "no restraints can hold it back from wandering in
forbidden bypaths and thrusting upward to the heights."'^ By "human
curiosity" Calvin means "human reason," which, as he has already
explained in the previous book, is limited in its understanding; for in his
analysis of "what human reason can discern with regard to God's Kingdom
and to spiritual insight"—where spiritual insight consists of "knowing
God" and "knowing his fatherly favour in our behalf, in which our
salvation consists"—Calvin asserts that "the greatest geniuses are blinder
than moles!": "Human reason, therefore, neither approaches, nor strives
toward, nor even takes a straight aim at, this truth: to understand who the
true God is or what sort of God he wishes to be toward us" (1: 277-78).
That is why Calvin continues to warn against the indulgence of human
reason in (at least) matters of election, especially by those "certain men not
otherwise bad" who easily yield to it:
Let them remember that when theyinquire into predestination
they are penetrating the sacred precincts of divine wisdom. If
anyone with carefree assurance breaks into this place, he will
not succeed in satisfying his curiosity and he will enter a
labyrinth from which he can find no exit. For it is not right for
man unrestrainedly to search out things that the Lord has
willed to be hid in himself, and to unfold from eternity itself the
sublimest wisdom, which he would have us revere but not
understand that through this also he should fill us with wonder.
(2: 922-23)

exclude the female reader, but is used in the generic sense for the sake of clarity.
^ John Calvin, Institutes of Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2
vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 2; 922. All further references are to this edition.
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When human reason embarks on the study of predestination, it is
confounded by a divine wisdom that gives it no escape. Rather than
moving toward a satisfactory conclusion, it enters a labyrinth from which
there is no rest. Wandering and searching through this labyrinth of
predestination—what Sim terms "contemplation of soteriological
paradox"—is what believers must not do if they wish to prevent its
resulting anxiety.
Contemplation of soteriological paradox goes hand in hand with
contemplation of electoral status—that is, the search for the evidences of
grace that ascertain God's favor upon the individual. But the acute
introspection that is employed in thesearch for assurance is precisely what
will produce uncertainty, for even good works, by their imperfection and
impurity, cannot but testify to the wrath of God. That is why Calvin tells
us so strongly that "when the Christian looks at himself he can only have
grounds for anxiety, indeed despair."^ Calvin, then, rejects the contem
plation—that is, carnal reason—that Sim believes the theologian and his
followers cultivate. It might seem a bit unfair, however, to dismiss the
importance of this aspect in Calvin's theology. To be sure, the opening
pages of the Institutes call us to a knowledge of self that seemingly
demands introspection; but the self-examination that Calvin requires is
not introspection of God's hidden plans of election but awareness of
human sinfulness:
Each of us must...be so stung by the consciousness of his own
happiness to attain at least some knowledge of God. Thus, from
the feeling of our own ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity,
and—what is more—depravity and corruption, we recognize
that the true light of wisdom, sound virtue, full abundance of
every good, and purity of righteousness rest in the Lord alone.
(2: 36)

'Calvin's Commentaries:TheFirstEpistleofPaulto the Corinthians, trans.J. Pringle (Edinburgh:
1960), 16. See also CiWia, Institutes, 1:786.
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It is this conviction of our depravity and corruption that prompts us to
look to the holiness and goodness of God—"we cannot seriously aspire to
him before we begin to become displeased with ourselves"—and so bring
us to faith (1:36-37). "Faith to Calvin," as R.T. Kendall puts it, "may be
described as merely witnessing what God has already done in Christ."'
(This may as well be the description of Christian's unburdening at the
Cross, which demonstrates what Bunyan means by "faith.") When we
have faith there is no need to look for assurance, in the sense of searching
for evidences of grace, because faith is assurance. Indeed, Kendall later
explains that "when Calvin uses the word faith he means assurance of
saving faith, salvation, eternal life, or election. The later distinction
between faith and assurance seems never to have entered Calvin's mind."'"
That is to say, Calvin does not drive a wedge between faith and assurance
(as Haskin claims Bunyan does), which is why it would be foolish (or
dangerous, as Calvin would say) for him to recommend the verification of
faith from something other than itself. Rather than rationalizing about
whether we are saved or damned, he urges us to believe:
Here, indeed, is the chief hinge on which faith turns: that we do
not regard the promises of mercy that God offers as tme only
outside ourselves, but not at all in us; rather that we make them
ours by inwardly embracing them. Hence, at last is born that
confidence which Paul elsewhere calls "peace"...Now it is an
assurance that renders the conscience calm and peaceful before
God's judgement. (1: 561)
We make the promises of mercy ours by inwardly embracing them. These
promises, of course, are found in God's Word, and "the same Word is the
basis whereby faith is supported and sustained; if it turns away from the
Word, it falls. Therefore, take away the Word and no faith will then
remain" (1: 549). Faith, then, is coextensive with the Word of God, and

' Calvin and English Calvinism to1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).20.
KendaU, Calvin.24-25.
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it is a faith to which Calvin points us again and again as he warns us
against the impropriety of human reason.
One might object that the description I give of Calvin's attitude
toward faith and assurance cannot be equally applied to Bunyan. After all,
does not Bunyan align himself with the experimental predestinarians in
his insistence on self-examination, a duty to which the last four lines of the
"Apology" directs the reader?
Would'st read thy self, and read thou know'st not what
And yet know whether thou art blest or not.
By reading the same lines? O then come hither.
And lay my Book, thy Head and Heart together. (7)
Certainly Bunyan, like the experimental predestinarians, directs the reader
to self-examination, and they all agree that the purpose of that selfexamination is to know the condition of one's spiritual estate. That
condition is invariably one of corruption and sin, which, as Bunyan
records in his treatise Justification by an Imputed Righteousness, one must
diagnose in himself to come to a saving knowledge of Christ:
Get good acquaintance with the covenant of grace, and of the
persons concerned in the conditions of that covenant....That
this truth may be the more heartily inquired into by thee,
consider thine own Perfections; I say, study how polluted thou
art, even from the heart throughout. No Man hath a high
esteem of the Lord Jesus that is a stranger to his own sore."
Of course, the conviction of one's inner pollution and sin that derives
from self-examination is accompanied, in the larger picture, with the
realization that its full force has already been dealt with by Christ.
Accordingly, Bunyan writes of himself, "I am brought into another
Covenant, under better promises, promises of life and salvation, free

The Miscellaneous Works ofJohn Bunyan^^cn. ed. RogcrSharrock, 13 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967-94), 12: 355-56. All further references are to this edition.
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promises to comfort me without my merit, even through the blood of
Jesus, the satisfaction given to God forw^ byhim" (2:195). This doctrine
of salvation comforts the individual on the understanding that he can do
nothing
to his salvation; he simply rests in the knowledge that
Christ has done it all, declaring "my Christ is all, hath done all, and will
deliver me from all" (2: 195). But the joyful promise of the second
doctrine cannot be embraced without the misery of the first; so it is the
intent of Bunyan to impress upon us the negativity of the first that we may
be driven to the hope of the second.
The ultimate goal of self-examination, then, is faith in the promises
of Cod. It is at this point, however, that Bunyan differs from the experi
mental predestinarians. He does not differ in understanding the goal of
self-examination as assurance, since, for Bunyan (as we shall see), to speak
of faith is to speak of assurance. The difference, however, is that assurance
for Bunyan, following Calvin, is not separate from faith, and thus he
thinks that there is no need to gain assurance through the searching of
marks or evidences ofelection or regeneration. (Notice that this is not the
same as the self-examination that brings conviction of sin.) This is evident
when Bunyan warns against those who doubt whether they are of the elect
or not:
Though election is, in order, before calling, as to Cod, yet the
knowledge of calling must go before the belief of my election, as
to myself. Wherefore, souls that doubt of the truth of their
effectual calling, do but plunge themselves into a deeper
labyrinth of confusion that concern themselves with their
election; I mean, while theylabour to know it before they prove
their calling. (11:88)
When Bunyan says that by his lines one may"know whether thou art blest
or not," he is not, as many commentators mistakenly think, encouraging
an interrogation of the self in terms of election and reprobation.'^ Rather

See, for example, Haskin, "Burden of Interpretation," 256-78.
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he tells us to "lay the thoughts of thy election by, and ask thyself these
questions":
Do I see mylost condition? Do I see salvation is nowhere but in
Christ? Would I share in this salvation by faith in him? And
would I...be thoroughly saved, to wit, from the filth as from the
guilt? Do I love Christ, his Father, his saints, his words, and
ways? This is the way to prove we are elect. (11: 88-89)
We know whether we are blessed or not if we can answer these questions
in the affirmative. That is to say, we must diagnose our condition as
corrupt and deserving of judgment ("lost condition") and then have faith
in the perfected righteousness of Christ. In this way, Bunyan bypasses the
route of searching for the evidences of election by implicitly postulating
that faith is itself the only proof, and therefore that one should simply
believe. Indeed, as Bunyan warns in another place, "the end of my speaking
of this [justification by grace through the redemption of Christ], is to
shew you that it is not wisdom now to doubt whether God will save you
or no, but to believe, because all things are finished as to our justification"
(2:198). The purpose of self-examination, then, is to make us aware of our
sin in order that we may be driven to faith in Christ, and that faith is our
assurance; apart from that, it is redundant and indeed it is antipathetic to
wisdom (that is, carnal) to supplement or increase a certainty already
gained by faith.
Bunyan therefore aligns himself with Calvin in both his understand
ing of faith and assurance and his awareness of the attendant dangers that
can result when faith is abandoned for human effort and reason. An
instance in which such a danger is dramatized is when Christian and
Hopeful encounter a monument that has written on its head:"Remember
Lot's Wife" (108). That monument—which they conclude to be "the
Pillar of Salt into which Lot's Wife was turned for her looking back with
a covetous heart, when she was going from Sodom for safety"—provokes a
discourse among the two pilgrims about the significance of Lot's wife, who
serves as a sign of caution or exemplary warning to others, as do the some
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two hundred and fifty men who perished in the city she fled (109). Both
the pillar of salt and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah are
punishments that result from God's judgment on the wickedness of Lot's
wife and her native inhabitants, a wickedness so great that it makes
Christian think that the possibility of redemption for them is no longer
available:
It is said of the men of Sodom, That they were sinners exceed
ingly, because they were sinners before the Lord; that is, in his
eyesight; and notwithstanding the kindnesses that he had
shewed them, for the Land of Sodom, was now, like the Garden
of Eden heretofore. This therefore provoked him the more to
jealousie, and made their plague as hot as the fire of the Lord
out of Heaven could make it. And it is most rationally con
cluded, that such, even such as theise are, that shall sin in the
sight, yea, and that too in despite of such examples that are set
continually before them, to caution them to the contrary, must
be partakers of severest Judgements. (110)
Christian here is performing a quasi-legal analysis, indicated by his usage
of logical words ("because," "for," "therefore," "it is most rationally
concluded," "must") and qualifiers ("notwithstanding,""even," "despite,")
that join the piling clauses and subclauses. It is an analysis that is entirely
rational, moving irresistibly to a single conclusion, and as such it fails to
register, as Hopeful replies, the alternative (irrational) option of mercy to
the severe judgment of God: "Doubtless thou hast said thetruth, but what
a mercy is it, that neither thou, but especially I, am not made, my self, this
example", (110).'' The reader is thus offered two choices—Christian's
conclusive judgment (human reason) or Hopeful's brief admission

"Stanley Fish also notices that Christian's logical conclusions fail to take account of mercy, but
he does not note the reply of mercy by Hopeful which counters both his (initial) harsh
pronouncements and Christian's. See Self-Consuming Artifacts; The Experience of SeventeenthCentury Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 223.
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(faith)—but the significance of his response will only be fully realized in
the moments that succeed it.
After their reasonable discussion, Christian and Hopeful make their
way to the River of God and stay in its surroundings for several days and
nights. Upon their departure, they are discouraged by the roughness of the
way, and, "as they went on, they wished for better way" (111). Signifi
cantly, Christian sights an easier way—a stile that leads to the By-PathMeadow—and he persuades H opefiil that it will not lead them out of the
way. But of course it does, and one cannot but notice that, at least on one
level, the By-Path-Meadow is in fact an imaginative presentation of the
labyrinth of predestination, for it leads the pilgrims to trespass on the
grounds of Doubting-Castle, which are presided over by none other than
Giant Despair. The way Christian wants to tread is created by his
dependence on human reason; and just as his reason condemned the sins
of the men of Sodom, so it condemns him to a doubt and despair that
leads him to contemplate suicide: "Brother, said Christian, what shall we
do ? The life that we now live is miserable: for my part, I know not whether
is best to live thus, or to die out of hand? My soul chuseth strangling rather
than life-, and the Grave is more easie for me than this Dungeon:Shall we
be ruled by the Giant?" (115). At this point, the reader (if he has been
careful to remember his earlier choices) may respond in two ways: (1) he
may decide, operating under carnal reason, that Christian's misery is the
inevitable "punishment" or "oppression" under what John Stachniewski
calls "the regime of a Calvinist God"; or. (2) he may decide, operating
under savirig faith, that Christian's misery is caused by his failure to claim
the promises of salvation.''' It is of course the second option that Bunyan
finally affirms when, in the course of the narrative. Christian is able to
reverse his misery by embracing the promise that is found in his bosom; so
consequently the reader learns that the antidote to anxiety is not more
reason (it only makes it worse) but faith in the mercy of God.

The Persecutory Imagination: English Puritanism and the Literature of Religious Despair
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 180,193-94.
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However much he has already learned about faith. Christian is
unable to free himself completely from his reliance on reason. This is
evident in the questions he asks the Shepherds following his escape from
Doubting-Castle:
Chr. Is this the way to the Celestial City?
You are just in your way.
Chr. How far is it thither?
Shep. Too far for any, but those that shall get thither indeed.
Chr. Is the way safe, or dangerous?
Shep. Safe for those for whom it is to be safe, but transgressors
shall fall therein. (119)
Christian demonstrates that he is still captive to a worldly epistemology,
an epistemology that conceives the way in spatial and physical configura
tions—"Is this the way...?" "How far is it thither?"—rather than in moral
and interior ones. That is, he comprehends the way in terms of visible and
measurable locations rather than in terms of individual dispositions that
vary according to faith. Thomas H. Luxon notes of this passage that
"Christian gives every indication that he has not yet relinquished his
carnal notions of the outward thingness of the way"; "that he asks such
questions at all indicates that he does not yet see the way for what it is, so
the doubts that prompt such questions must also produce doubtful
answers."'' Rather than give the kind of answers that Christian's questions
seem to stipulate, the Shepherds give equivocations that frustrate his mode
of reasoning. Indeed, they are equivocations that also frustrate us—refus-

Thomas H. Luxon, Literal Figures: Puritan Allegory and the Reformation Crisis in Representa
tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 183. Michael Davies similarly notes that
Christian **is attempting to consider the way not in spiritual but in carnal terms." See Graceful
Reading: Theology andNarrative in theWorks ofJohn Bunyan (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 245. On how Bunyan despatializes the image of the way, see James Turner, "Bunyan's
Sense ofPlace," in Vincent Newcy, cd., ThePilgrim'sProgress{Toto^^x Barnes and Noble, 1980),
91-110. On the individuality of the way in general, see also Fish, Self Consuming Artifacts,
224-64.
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ing to chart a geographical map of the way or to anticipate the end of the
narrative—and thus teach us to renounce the carnal notions (plotthinking, logical causes and effects, linear sequences, outward signs) that
govern the way we interpret the text.
It may seem, however, that such answers are not only evasive but
needlessly harsh. Why rebuke Christian so harshly for his faulty ques
tions? (Would it not be better to give a gentler reply?) More than a few
critics argue that the Shepherd's unsympathetic responses demonstrate the
harsh and inhumane nature of Bimyan's Calvinism. Frequently cited as
evidence is the third of these responses—"Safe for those for whom it is to
be safe"—of which A. Richard Dutton declares; "That is predestination
in the baldest terms."'^ Similarly, Sim voices the same sentiment when he
states, "there is an entire theological position encapsulated in that line, one
unmistakably based on the Calvinist doctrines ofelection and justification
by faith." "For a Calvinist like Bunyan," he continues, "one's spiritual faith
was seen to be predestined by God, whose verdict on matters of salva
tion...was final, unquestionable, and completely unchangeable by human
efforts." When this is contemplated in relation to the other components
of predestination (such as that of reprobation and human responsibility),
the result is, as we all now know, an interminable anxiety in the elect. It is
therefore the inducement of anxiety that the Shepherds desire for the
pilgrims (or so the argument goes) when they show them a series of
"wonders"—the shattered men at the bottom of Mount Error, the blinded
victims of Giant Despair at Mount Caution, the deluded hypocrites who
take a by-way to Hell (120-22). These wonders for Stachniewski are really
"harrowing sights" that are deliberately displayed for maximum impact:
"The terror of the inauthenticity of elect experience is what impels the
pilgrims forward. It is to secure this effect, presumably, that the euphemis
tic wonders' were put to show. The emphasis is on arbitrariness of
election and the possibility of being deceived." In the harrowing sights and
the test of the pilgrims' skill at Hill Clear, Stachniewski further argues that

" Richard Dutton, "Interesting, but Tough': Reading The Pilgrim's Progress' Studies inEn^ish
Literature 1500-1900.18 (1978): 449.
" Sim, ""Safe for Those for Whom It Is to Be Safe," 149.
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"the familiar system of mind control, playing on fears of hypocrisy and
rejection, is practiced—on the contemporary reader as well as the
characters."'® The reader and the characters, then, are subject to an intense
anxiety that irrevocably flows from the harshness and severity inherent in
the Calvinist theology of Banyan.
But in fact what cannot flow from Banyan's Calvinist theology is the
anxiety that it seeks to stop. Here the harshness of the Shepherds' rebuke
is not a testament to a despairing theology but a reflection of the danger
that Christian's questions invite. That is, the harsh rebuke is in proportion
to the danger that such reasoning presents, one so threatening and real
that the Shepherds must make every effort to educate the pilgrims in the
truth. Of course, Dutton, Sim, and Stachniewski fail (or, rather, are
unable) to see the danger because their interpretations are informed by the
very kind of reasoning that the Shepherds reject. That is why such critics
claim the wonders shown to Christian and Hopeful as further induce
ments to anxiety; but these wonders are really an extension of the rebuke
performed in the Shepherds' earlier replies. The sight at Mount Caution
is a case in point. When the pilgrims observe from this mountain "several
men walking up and down among the Tombs" who are unable to escape
because of their blindness, it prompts Christian to ask, "What means
this?" (121). The Shepherds answer his question by narrating a sequence
of events that account for the state of these men, which they start by
directing the pilgrims' sight to a stile:
From that Stile there goes a path that leads directly to
Doubting-Castle, which is kept by GiantDespair, and these men
(pointing to them among the Tombs) came once on Pilgrimage,
as you do now, even till they came to that same Stile. And
because the right way was rough in that place, they chose to go
out of it into that Meadow, and there were taken by Giant
Despair, and cast into Doubting-Castle-, where, after they had a
while been kept in the Dungeon, he at last did put out their

"Stachniewski, Persecutory Imagination, 206-7.
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eyes, and led them among those Tombs, where he has left them
to wander to this very day, that the saying of the wise Man
might be fulfilled. He that wandereth out of the way of under
standing, shall remain in the Congregation of the dead. Then
Christian and Hopeful looked one upon another, with tears
gushing oiit; but yet said nothing to the Shepherds. (121)

The narration here could be read as a recapitulation of the earlier episode
of (and the events leading up to) Doubting-Castle, but it is a recapitula
tion with a difference. Of course, it is a difference that makes all the
difference, since the men among the tombs are blind, yet Christian and
Hopeful still perceive. The pilgrims are thus able to perceive the destitu
tion they may have assumed if they had continued with their rationalising.
The men in that state are fittingly men who "wander" just as Milton's
fallen angels do in Paradise Lost as they speculate about the problerri of
divine providence and human will:
Others apart sat on a Hill retir'd.
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, "Will, and Fate,
Fixt Fate, Free will. Foreknowledge absolute.
And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost.''
Milton's dismissal of these musings four lines later as "Vain wisdom" and
"false Philosophic" accords with Bunyan's quotation of Proverbs 21:6,
which elaborates what "wander" means: "He that wandereth out of the
way of understanding, shall remain in the Congregation of the dead."
Wandering is an image of restlessness, an inescapable maze, that so
accurately describes the condition of speculation, which is also the
condition of death. It is an image that, of course, owes as much to the
Bible's Proverbs as to Calvin's labyrinth, and Bunyan draws upon both to

'^JoKn Milton, Complete Poemsand Major Prose,cd.'bAtnix.x.'^.Hughes (1957; rep. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), Book 2, II. 557-61.
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emphasise the faithlessness—the lack of spiritual understanding—of those
who wander. Not surprisingly. Christian and Hopeful then look at one
another "with tears gushing out," shocked because theynow realize the full
extent of their wanderings, wanderings which, if not stopped by faith,
would have turned
into a cautionary example for others. The wonder
at Mount Caution is thus a continuation of the rebuke first enacted in the
Shepherds' evasive replies; for from that initial moment they (and
Bunyan) see that it is necessary to disabuse Christian and Hopeful (and
the reader) of their carnal reason.
The distinction between carnal reason and saving faith that I have
been making in the preceding pages is a distinction not all the characters
in T^e Pilgrim's Progress are able to make. One such character is Talkative,
whose discourse with Faithful shows him to be sufficiently adept at
rehearsing the points of sound doctrine. Indeed, at one point he says that
by talk "a man may learn the necessity of the New-birth, the insufficiency
of our works, the need of Christs righteousness"—the doctrine which is
the subject of many of Bunyan's works and the centrepiece of his
theology—so it is no wonder that Faithful is deceived by his knowledge
(76). The reader, however, is not deceived; for Talkative's name indicates
in advance his status as a false pilgrim; but what is unclear is how this
pilgrim—who Gordon Campbell claims is "the only knowledgeable good
systematic theologian"in the work—could be so mistaken.^" We are given
a clue when Christian reveals to Faithful the true nature of Talkative: "He
is the very stain, reproach and shame of Religion to all that know him; it
can hardly have a good word in all that end of Town where he dwells.
Thus say the common People that know him,A Saint abroad,andaT>t\i\
at home" (78). After returning to his discourse. Faithful clarifies to us the
false pilgrim's mistake when he makes a crucial point:
There is therefore knowledge, and knowledge. Knowledge that
resteth in the bare speculation of things, and knowledge that is

Gordon Campbell, "The Theology of The Pilgrim's Progress^" in Ncwey, ed., The Pilgrim's
Progressy 258.
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accompanied with the grace of faith and love, which puts a man
upon doing even the will of Godfrom the heart: thefirst of these
will serve the Talker, but the other the true Christian is not
content. (82)

This is a distinction that Talkative is unable to grasp—the one between
knowledge, on the one hand, which is severed from the other parts of life
that it is supposed to inform, and knowledge, on the other hand, which is
inextricable from the faith that compels an obedience to God.The former
knowledge bare speculation") is akin to the speculations of Christian and
Hopeful (and Milton's fallen angels), although the danger it presents is
not anxiety but self-delusion.Talkative mistakenly conceives religion as a
set of philosophical or theoretical propositions which has no bearing on
the existence that he otherwise leads, and thereby enacts a split between
his private and public life {^A Saint abroad, and a Devil at home"). To
think that this is knowledge is self-delusory because it is in fact no
knowledge at all; it is knowledge that trivializes belief, diminishes its
importance, renders it ineffective.
This is the knowledge that a true Christian rejects. He rejects it
because it is the knowledge of carnal reason, which (in one of its forms)
comprehends the religious life as a number of more or less strongly held
"notions" (as Faithful correctly labels them) that are abstracted from the
world of action (83). Religion is thus confined to and evidenced in the
sphere of utterance. That is why the two signs of grace that Talkative
offers, "a great out-cry against sin" and "Great knowledge of Gospel
Mysteries," are merely verbal, and as such Faithful dismisses them both as
false (81-82). True knowledge, in contrast, is that which dissolves the
separation of knowledge and faith and love and speech and action.^' "A
work ofgrace in the soul" Faithful explains, only "discovereth itself" to a
man in this way:

Georgia B. Christopher notes that the Reformers conflated such categories which we now (in
a post-Cartesian, post-Enlightenment age) take to be distinct. See Milton and the Science of the
Saints (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 9.
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It gives him conviction of sin, especially of the defilement of his
nature, and the sin of unbelief, (for the sake of which he is sure
to be damned, if he findeth not mercy at Gods hand by faith in
Jesus Christ.) This sight and sense of things worketh in him
sorrow and shame for sin; he findeth moreover revealed in him
the Saviour of the World, and the absolute necessity of closing
with him, for life, at which he findeth hungrings and thirstings
after him, to which hungrings, &c. thepromise is made. (82-83)
When such "an experimental confession of his Faith in Christ" has been
made, a man's life is thus "answerable to that confession, to wit, a life of
holiness" that is, a life that is intent on doing the will of God (83). Faith,
then, is true knowledge; it is by faith that the promises of mercy are
embraced, and it is by faith that our ways of knowing, being, saying, and
doing are generated. Talkative is unable to comprehend that faith (he,
after all, has no experience of it); he operates under the illusion that bare
speculation is the means to salvation, whereas such speculation or carnal
reason is really the means to damnation. In short, he mistakes the way of
reason for the way of faith, and that mistake is one the reader must heed
when he confronts the character of Ignorance.
Bunyan's portrayal of Ignorance has caused considerable problems
for many readers. Like Talkative, he is damned; but unlike Talkative, who
is cruel to his family and servants. Ignorance has the virtue of being
attractive. He is first noted by the narrator as "a very brisk Lad," and when
Christian asks how Ignorance thinks he will be admitted at the gate of the
Celestial City, he replies: "I know my Lords will, and I have been a good
Liver, I pay every man his own; I Pray, Fast, pay Tithes, and give Alms, and
have left my Countrey, for whither I am going" (124). His declaration of
religious piety and fairness is met by Christian's (offensive) charge—"thou
art a Theif and a Robber"—which Ignorance gently turns aside: "Gentle
men, ye be utter strangers to me, I know you not, be content to foUow the
Religion of your Countrey, and I will follow the Religion of mine. I hope
all will be well" (124). Here, then, is a man who critics have described as
"meek and essentially well meaning" (StuartSim), the only character who
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spoke any sense in the book (James Turner), "likeable and tolerant"
(Henri A. Talon), and one who "possesses courtesy and mod
esty—qualities not usually associated with conceited fools" (Brainerd
Stranaban)?^ He is not a "foof as Christian su^ests be is—that is, "wise
in bis own conceit" (124); rather. Christian and Hopeful are "vain and
boastful" when compared to Ignorance, who, Alfred Noyes notes, "strikes
one as a far better Christian and a far more honest man."^' Honest, court
eous, likeable, modest, meek, pious, fair, tolerant—these are the attributes
that appeal to our moral sensibility, and are thus the attributes that
constitute for us a successful pilgrim.
Why then is Ignorance damned? Some commentators who are
uncomfortable with Bunyan's doctrine have su^ested that Bunyan was
simply wrong, that he erred in his judgment of Ignorance. Others argue
that Bunyan was restricted by his severe Calvinist doctrine: Ignorance is
fatally damned by the "unfair tactics" (as Sim labels them) of an arbitrary
predestination that he could not voluntarily change, and, as a further
interrogation of this argument, shows he evidently lacks the necessary
anxiety which typically marks out the elect. Still others maintain their
appreciation of Bunyan, explaining away the impact of the damnation by
emphasizing the artistic immortality of Ignorance that transcends the
author's regrettable creed. (Vincent Newey declares that Ignorance is
"redeemed through art.")^' What all these answers assume is a disparity

" Sim, ""Safe for Those for Whom It Is to Be Safe," 152-53: James Turner,
Gentleman's
Magazine (1741), cited in the introduction to The Pilgrim's Progress: A Casebook, ed. Roger
Sharrock (London: Macmillan Press,1976), 20;WeTaiK.'VAon,JohnBunyan:TheManandHis
Works, trans. Barbara Wall (London:RockliffPublishing Corporation, 1951),211-12; Brainerd
P. Stranahan, "Bunyan's Satire and Its Biblical Sources," in Robert Collmer, ed., Bunyan in Our
Time (Kent; Kent State University Press, 1989), 53.
^'Alfred Noyes, "Bunyan—a Revaluation," TheBookman7^ (1928): 14.
Sim, ""Safe for Those for Whom It Is to Be Safe,"152-53.
Vincent Newey, "Bunyan and the Confines of the Mind," in Newey,ed.. The Pilgrim's Progress,
44. These views are reported or held by the following ctitics: Button, "'Interesting, but Tough,'"
439-56; James F. Forrest, "Bunyan's Ignorance and the Flatterer: AStudy in the LiteraryArt of
Damnation," Studies in Philology 60 (1963): 121-26; Maurice Hussey, "Bunyan's 'Mr.
Ignorance,' " Modem Language Review 44 (1949): 128-38; Sir Walter Scott, "Review of The
Pilgrim's Progress' Quarterly Review ^ (1830), rep. in Sharrock, ed.. The Pilgrim's Progress-. A
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between Bunyan's sympathetic portrayal of Ignorance and his subsequent
condemnation, and an unwritten rule that there should be none. The
disparity, however, is deliberate, for in the character of Ignorance Bunyan
presents us with another (and final) temptation that demands a choice
between faith and reason. Those who have learned the lesson of Chris
tian's rebuke by the Shepherds and Faithful's distinction between
knowledge and knowledge will understand that it is dangerous to depend
on carnal reason; but even if those leSsons have been learned (and
especially if they have not), one is still susceptible to its lure.
That lure, which is basic to Ignorance's other qualities, is what Talon
calls "the rational character of his faith": he grounds his hope on thoughts
of God and Heaven ("I am always full of good motions") and relies on the
intuition of his heart to confirm the validity of that hope ("My heart tells
me so") (144-45).^^ Ignorance is a Lockean empiricist—that is, he reasons
on the basis of reliable sensation—and he therefore cannot believe in
''revelations^' calling them "thefruit of distracted hraines" and"whimzies,",
that is, the symptoms of madness and insanity (148-49).^^ In comparison

Casebook, 59-60; Sim, ""Safe for Those for Whom It Is to Be Safe,'" 149-60; Sim, Negotiations
with Paradox,44-70; Stachniewski, Persecutory Imagination,208-16.
^ Talon,/oA» Bunyan, 211. Benjamin Myers notes that this reasoning is circular in "Bunyan's
Gospel: The Theological Role of Mr. Ignorancein ThePilgrim's Progress,' Reformed Theological
Review 62 (2003): 29-38. But the circularity is not so much a problem as the first principle of
that circularity, which is Ignorance's own experience.
^ Some commentators have noted that Ignorance also represents the Latitudinarians, althougfi
some go too far by saying that Ignorance is in fact a particular historical figure such as Edward
Fowler or Samuel Parker. See William York Tindall,/tf^» Bunyan, Mechanick Preacher (New
York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 61-63; TAon,John Bunyan, 212; N. H. Keeble, The Literary
Culture of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth-Century England (Leicester: Leicester University
Press, 1987), 249; Davies(7njf^//?e«<//«g;235. Isabel Riverspoints out that the Latitudinarians
had a religion of reason in which it was claimed that an "innate knowledge [was] shared by all
mankind of thenature of God" and thatone had toexercise one's reason in order to be convinced
of the tightnessof their religion. In contrast, the Nonconformists (of which Bunyan wasa part)
based their religion on grace and argued that reason could not be trusted as much as the
Latitudinarians would like to think. See her Reason, Grace and Sentiment:A Study ofLanguage
ofRelipon and Ethics in England, 1660-1780,vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
I99I), 60, chapten 2 and 3, as well as "Grace, Holiness, and the Pursuit of Happiness: Bunyan
and Restoration Latitudinarianism," in N. H. Keeble, ed., John Bunyan: Conventicle and
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to the revelations Christian and Hopeful, Talon comments, "His faith is
more reasonable."^' It is more reasonable not only because it is based on
firm (rather than illusory) experience but because it is dependent on the
quality of one's moral performance:
I believe that Christ died for sinners, and that I shall be justified
before God from the curse, through his gracious acceptance of
my obedience to his Law: Or thus, Christ makes my Duties that
are Religious, acceptable to his Father by virtue of his Merits;
and so shall I be justified. (147)
The logic construes "Christ died for sinners" as meaning that his life acts
as an example for others to follow in order that they also will be justified.
It has the appearance of being the justification of faith, where Christ
makes sinners acceptable to God by virtue oihis merits; but in Ignorance's
formulation it is religious duties—that is, obedience to the Law—that
make sinners acceptable to God. In other words, Ignorance locates his
faith in the ability to perform a list of moral commands—based on the
presupposition that one must earn salvation in the same way one must
earn everything else in life—and it is faith that Christian immediately
designates as"a ¥sXstFaith,because it takethJustificationfrom the personal
righteousness of Christ, and applies it to thy own" (147).
True faith, however, is the reverse, but Ignorance cannot accept
it since it seems to permit licentiousness:
Ignor. What! Would you have us trust to what Christ in
his own person has done without us? This conceit would loosen
the reines of our lust, and tolerate us to live as we list: For what
matter how we live if we may be Justified by Christs personal
righteousness from all, when we believe it?

Parnassus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 45-70.
^ Talon,7i)A« Bunyan, 211.
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Chr. Ignorance is thy name, and as thy name is, so art thou-,
even this thy answer demonstrateth what I say. Ignorant thou art
of whatJustifying righteousness is,and, as Ignorant how to secure
thy Soul through thefaith ofitfrom the heavy wrath of God. Yea
thou also art Ignorant of the true effects of saving faith in this
righteousness of Christ, which is, to bow and win over the heart to
God in Christ, to love his Name, his Word, Ways and People,and
not as thou ignorantly imaginest. (148)
Ignorance's objection is plausible to the reader, even if the course of the
debate has been weighted in favor of Christian; and it is made more
plausible when Christian resorts to an ad hominem reply, one that Dutton
observes "initially seems nothing more than name-calling." This is the
kind of reply that makes critics dismiss Christian as arrogant and
Ignorance as modest: for, as Dutton continues, it "is not advanced in a
spirit of rational debate, but as a triumphant self-justification—not with
the intention of convincing either Ignorance or a sceptical reader (who are
one and the same thing) but with the effect of vindicating its own
subjective rectitude."^' But the conversation cannot be "advanced in a
spirit of rational debate" because the beliefs on which their rationality is
based are fixndamentally opposed to Christian's. Ignorance (and the reader
who agrees with him) believes that reason exercises autonomy over the
Word of God. Ignorance believes that the human heart is without
corruption and is therefore able to please God on its own efforts ("I am
always full of good motions"). Ignorance believes that the way to the
Celestial city is manifold, which means which means one must require a
tolerance of those who may tread a different path to its gates ("be content
to follow the Religion of your Countrey, and I will follow the Religion of
mine"). Ignorance believes that the moral life consists of a set of religious
postures that are achieved in separation to faith. Ignorance believes that
the only alternative to licentiousness is legalism. Ignorance believes, in
short, that the way of faith can be substituted by the way of reason.

Dutton, "'Interesting, but Tough,'" 443.
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Christian believes none of these things. The way of faith cannot start
or continue without the self-awareness of the corruption within, the
unconditional acceptance of God at his Word, the intolerant renunciation
of all paths except Christ, or the spiritual experience of the all-pervasive
effects of saving faith. Most important, the way of faith must always accept
and conform to the Word of God. Of course, the reader will only realize
this after Ignorance's damnation, and will be driven back to reconsider,
first of all, the harmfiilness of Ignorance's reasoning, a reasoning that so
consistently subverts the Word of God that it is positively carnal.
Christian, in the extended dialogue, points out that "good thoughts" must
"agree with the Word of God"—which can only be established "when we
pass the sameJudgement upon our selves which the Word passes"—but Ig
norance's good thoughts agree not with Scripture but with his heart
(145-46). Since Ignorance is unwilling to examine the deceitfulness of his
heart and yet claims to "believe in Christ," Christian says that "Thou believest with a Fantastical Faith, for this faith is no where described in the
Word" (147). In addition, the reader may also notice the next time round
that "Ignorance" is at once a name and, as Christian's play on the word
signals, "a lethal condition, infecting any wayfarer's faith with a falseness
that breeds in every facet of the pilgrim-to-be's spiritual life."'" (Button's
ad hominem charge, then, does not apply because the issue is not just a
person's arguments but his moral and personal integrity.) Reinterpreted
correctly. Christian's reply shows how thoroughly ignorant—bereft of
true knowledge—Ignorance is, and there is no point engagingin "rational
debate" with a false pilgrim whose rationalityis so perverse that it imagines
a state of moral anarchy issuing from faith. ("The true effects of saving faith
in this righteousness of Christ, is not as thou ignorantly imaginest5) Rather
one must affirm (even arrogantly) the truth against all the falsehoods that
Ignorance literally embodies, since what is at stake are fundamental beliefs
on which the salvation of humans depend. Christian's warnings are
proven correct in the downfall of Ignorance, but the appropriateness of its
harshness is only understood after the fact. This downfall at once chastens

° Davies. GracefiilReading, 235.
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the reader of his attraction to Ignorance and leads him to retrace his steps.
The reader thuscomprehends Christian's warnings as warnings to him: he
must renounce his carnal reason for faith if he desires eternal life. That is,
he must no longer identify with Ignorance or be subjected to his charms
(insofar as that is possible); rather, he must embrace the promises of God
as they stand—to have faith as Christian and Hopeful do—or he too will
be carried off to the everlasting depths of Hell.
The damnation of Ignorance, then, is a calculated move to caution
the reader against the danger of a rational but false belief at the moment
he is most attracted to it; and the pattern of presenting a temptation and
discrediting it isone that Bunyan constantly employs in order that we may
be made aware of its dangers and so be purged of them. That temptation
comes in many forms—speculation, anxiety, self-delusion, rational
ity—but at bottom it is the temptation to choose carnal reason rather than
saving faith. It is a temptation, in other words, of thinking that there is
something that we can do to merit our salvation, to supplement it with
religious duties, to bolster it with evidence and signs; but the fact is that
there is nothing we can do and that Christ has done everything, and to
relieve our burdenswe need only to believe in him, to behold, as Christian
does, the mere "sight of the Cross."

